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This article builds on previous work that argues that a useful path for a “queer/ed 
criminology” to follow is one that takes “queer” to denote a position. It suggests that one way 
of developing such an approach is to adopt a particular understanding of critique – 
specifically one that draws from Michel Foucault’s view of critique as “the art of not being 
governed.” It then charts some of the possible directions for such a “queer/ed criminology.” 
While such an approach to critique has previously been discussed within critical 
criminologies, this article suggests that it is useful for queer criminologists to explore the 
opportunities that it affords, particularly in order to better appreciate how “queer/ed 
criminology” might connect to, draw from, or push against other currents among critical 
criminologies, and help to delineate the unique contribution that this kind of “queer/ed 
criminology” might make. 
 
Introduction 
Elliott Currie expresses a fundamental point about critical criminologies – “[t]here is no party 
line” (Currie 2002, vii). Instead, what unites critical criminologists, he suggests, “is a 
willingness to apply a critical lens not only to the work of their more conventional 
counterparts in the discipline but their own as well” (Currie 2002, vii). Similar points could 
be made regarding the way that queer theoretical perspectives have been taken up in a variety 
of fields – “queer” has come to signify a diverse array of ideas and intellectual as well as 
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political projects, all united by a critical attitude of some kind. In fact, for many queer 
theorists, the idea that there is, or ought to be, a set of boundaries or standards that would 
delimit a “queer” inquiry or perspective – a “party line,” if you will – would be thought of as 
problematic. 
Indeed, there are numerous similarities between critical criminologies and queer perspectives 
that would suggest that “queer/ed criminologies”1 would find a welcome home under the 
umbrella of critical criminologies. For example, following Jock Young, Walter DeKeseredy 
suggests that critical criminologists metaphorically “throw bricks through establishment or 
mainstream criminology’s windows” (DeKeseredy 2011: 6; Young 1998) – a statement that 
reflects the approach of many queer theorists when they seek to challenge identities, forms of 
regulation, and what they might argue is the foundational heteronormativity of various 
disciplines. Additionally, the notion of transgression, the pushing of boundaries, an embrace 
of “deviance,” various projects of deconstruction, and perhaps even a cheeky desire to be 
irreverent and have fun, have been part of the development of various critical criminologies 
from their very beginning in the National Deviancy Conferences (Mooney 2012: 14; 
Carrington and Hogg 2002: 3; Lea 1998: 168; Carrington 2002: 119; Cohen 1998) – 
sentiments and projects that are again echoed in the approaches taken by many queer 
theorists. 
                                                          
1 The term “queer/ed criminologies” is used in this article in preference to “queer criminology” for a number of 
reasons. Criminologies is used in order to signify that there are many different kinds of criminological 
approaches that might be considered to fall under this umbrella – something not necessarily captured in the 
possibly more reductive and singular “queer criminology,” which also implies some solidity. And queer/ed is 
preferred because it allows for the considerable play around the term “queer” to be more effectively represented 
– it simultaneously cites identity-based uses of the term as well as those uses that might consider it to be a 
process or activity (as in the notion of “queering”). 
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It is a reasonable assumption, then, that a “queer/ed criminology” might best be positioned 
within the ambit of critical criminology. Critical criminologies and queer theories share a 
common attitude of pushing against orthodox knowledges, politics, and ways of thinking – 
whether regarding crime and justice matters, or sexuality and gender issues. Strands of each 
body of thought are concerned with identifying the marginalization of some groups of people 
(feminist, counter-colonial, radical criminologies), and the role that various policies, 
knowledges, and forms of regulation play in creating and maintaining such marginalization, 
often seeking the reform of these policies, knowledges, and regulations in the interests of a 
particular conception of justice (DeKeseredy 2011: 7; Young 2002). And certainly, if a 
“queer/ed criminology” were to explore the ways that non-heteronormative and gender-
diverse people have been treated through the justice system; or if it were to highlight their 
interaction with criminal justice actors; or if it sought to identify heteronormativity in the 
criminal justice system, then it would seem logical for a “queer/ed criminology” to fit under 
the ambit of critical criminology. 
But, not all “queer/ed criminology” is critical in this sense. For example, some of the work 
that might be considered to fall under the ambit of “queer/ed criminology” (whether 
explicitly labeled as such by the authors, or referred to as such by others) might align more 
closely with traditional (even administrative) forms of criminology, if not for the fact that 
“queers” happen to be the subjects of the research. This is especially the case when lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, trans*, and queer (LGBTQ) populations have been “added” to the research – 
where research carried out on a particular crime for other groups (such as intimate partner 
violence) is simply replicated (with or without some minor changes to the language used or 
explanatory tools employed) for LGBTQ populations. Even those works that do engage with 
queer theoretical insights regarding sexuality and gender diversity, that unpack the 
homo/hetero binary, and that are attuned to matters of essentialism – such as some work on 
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hate crime – can often limit the boundaries of the critique that they offer. Queer concepts are 
frequently used in order to more effectively understand and represent the subjects of the 
research, and not in the other ways that they might be used, such as to think differently about 
the broader criminological enterprise itself (see Ball 2013a). To put it simply, the connection 
between critical criminology and “queer/ed criminology” is not necessarily as straightforward 
as it might appear. It is not clear whether “queer/ed criminology” is “queer” simply because it 
focuses on LGBTQ people, and nor is it clear that such a criminology is critical (in the same 
way as other critical criminologies) because it focuses on them. Thus, an important part of 
developing a “queer/ed criminology” is to explore the kind of critical task that it engages in 
and its connection to other critical criminologies. 
This article builds on previous work that suggests that one of the many useful paths for a 
“queer/ed criminology” to take is one that engages with a particular use of “queer” – 
specifically the use of “queer” as a verb to refer to doing something, and, by extension, a 
position from which something can be done (in contrast to “queer” understood as an identity 
or a set of theoretical concepts) (see Ball 2013a; Ball 2013b). This kind of approach to 
“queer” is already implied in some of the terminology used here, such as when one calls for 
the “queering” of criminology. The article suggests that one way of developing such an 
approach is to adopt a specific understanding of critique – one that draws from the work of 
Michel Foucault (developed by Judith Butler and explored in criminology by George 
Pavlich), and which sees critique as a virtue, a limit project, or, put simply, “the art of not 
being governed” (Foucault 1978). It does so for two reasons: in order to sketch out how one 
possible approach to “queer/ed criminology” might be developed; and in order to position 
that approach within criminology by delineating the ways in which it might connect to, draw 
from, or push against other currents among critical criminologies. Both tasks are central to 
the development of “queer/ed criminologies.” 
6 
 
As will be discussed, adopting the particular approach to critique suggested here within 
“queer/ed criminology” can help to distinguish this kind of approach from other strands of 
critical (and queer) criminological thought, particularly those that engage in criticism. 
Criticism of this type is premised on judgment, and positions the critic as legislator, 
identifying problems, gaps, or oversights in a body of knowledge or a set of relations, and 
prescribing solutions – that it should say this, or it ought to do that. There can be a marked 
tendency for this to occur within all critical criminologies, including queer ones. While this 
article does not deny the important role or productivity of such approaches, it suggests, by 
way of contrast, that thinking about critique as “the art of not being governed” can help to 
move past the sometimes less productive features of criticism and create new possibilities for 
“queer/ed criminologies.” 
Further, this article will also highlight that adopting within “queer/ed criminology” an 
approach to critique as the “art of not being governed” would allow these “queer/ed 
criminologies” to have relevance beyond LGBTQ communities. While LGBTQ communities 
are often the taken-for-granted objects and beneficiaries of analyses that label themselves 
“queer’”– and certainly work that does this and takes this focus is necessary and important – 
it is possible for the analyses produced with this approach to have positive and productive 
effects within criminology more broadly. This article opens up the possibility for “queer” to 
be uncoupled from sexuality or gender for productive gain. 
The article first establishes the arguments for a “queer/ed criminology” that takes “queer” to 
denote a position, drawing on existing problematizations of “queer/ed criminologies” that 
have been more fully developed elsewhere (Ball 2013a; Ball 2013b). It then elaborates on 
what it means to think of “queer” as denoting a position, and highlights the kinds of 
contributions that such an approach can make. Finally, the article considers the ways in which 
understanding critique as the “art of not being governed” can help a “queer/ed criminology” 
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develop along these lines, sketching out possible directions for such an approach, and 
highlighting the points at which it can draw from existing bodies of critical criminological 
(and other) thought. 
It must be noted at the outset that the approaches articulated within this article, which push 
for the interrogation of taken-for-granted assumptions and foundational concepts, are not 
entirely new perspectives within criminological thought, or new activities engaged in by 
criminologists. Bodies of postmodern and deconstructionist criminological thought, as well as 
other strands of critical criminology such as feminist and counter-colonial criminologies, 
have previously undertaken similar tasks (DeKeseredy 2011: 47-49; Young 2002: 252; 
Cohen 1998: 101; Lea 1998: 168; Carrington 2002; Cunneen 2011). While this article pushes 
“queer/ed criminology” towards the variety of deconstructive approaches within criminology, 
it does not suggest that such a “queer criminology” would simply repeat the arguments put 
forward there. Rather, it suggests that a “queer/ed criminology” might differentiate itself and 
maintain its position as “queer” by holding closely to the notion of critique as the “art of not 
being governed,” and by using this as a standard by which it decides to engage with or move 
away from other critical criminologies. Articulating in more detail the connections and 
differences between these criminologies and the approach to “queer/ed criminology” outlined 
here is an important task of future work – especially that which takes Pat Carlen’s concerns 
about “evangelism” in academic criminology seriously (Carlen 2011). This article simply 
points out where these connections and differences can be investigated. 
 
Problematizing “Queer” in Criminology 
To make the case that the understanding of critique suggested here can help build a “queer/ed 
criminology” that takes “queer” to denote a position, it is necessary to establish why that 
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particular approach is desirable. Such an approach is not only an original direction for 
thought in this area, but can also fill a space opened up by existing “queer/ed criminologies.” 
In previous work the author has argued that there are already multiple “queer/ed 
criminologies” (Ball 2013a). Some works utilize “queer” to refer to an identity category, and, 
according to those approaches, “queer/ed criminology” might be understood largely as an 
inclusion project seeking to ensure LGBTQ people are represented in criminological 
research, knowledge is produced about their experiences of crime, and “the focus of 
criminological inquiry [is reoriented] to give due consideration to the relationship between 
sexual orientation/gender identity and victimization, offending, and desistance from crime” 
(Woods 2013: PAGE). At the same time, other works utilize “queer theory” to provide a set 
of “sensitizing concepts” with which to understand and represent sexuality and gender 
diversity in criminological research, and explore a variety of forms of normative regulation 
that impact on those studied and that produce injustice in their lives (see Ball 2013a). 
While each of these approaches has been (and continues to be) productive in shifting 
criminological attention to a variety of new issues and concerns, and opening up new 
directions in criminological research, it is possible to point out a number of the limits that 
may be produced by them, and the avenues that they may leave unexplored. The first 
approach can be limited because it potentially leads to the adoption or use of essentialized 
understandings of identity in such research. While “queer” is often used as an umbrella label 
with which to refer to LGBTQ communities as a whole (in preference to initialisms such as 
LGBTQ) (Duggan 2001: 224), academic queer theorists try (with varying degrees of success) 
to avoid using it simply as a label because of the homogenizing and essentializing tendencies 
of such identity categories (Giffney 2009: 2; Anzaldúa in Sullivan 2003: 44; Sedgwick 2011: 
200). Nevertheless, studies that unproblematically adopt those identity categories in research 
can claim that they are “queer” by virtue of the fact that they focus on the “queer 
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community,” whether or not they engage with academic queer theoretical critiques of 
identity. 
Further, the second approach can be limited because, while such research might create 
theoretically sophisticated criminological analyses, the kinds of critique and the kinds of 
deconstruction that attach to the notion of “queer” are, more often than not, restricted – they 
are employed against some targets and not others. For example, queer theoretical insights 
might be utilized to understand the people involved in the research, but other aspects studied 
(such as a particular set of behaviours or a specific justice institution) remain untroubled (see 
further Ball 2013a: 4-5; Lea 1998; Bessant 2002). In addition, these approaches can still 
engage in more traditional criminological projects seeking to explain crime, instead of taking 
the attempt to explain crime as a possible target of deconstruction in itself.2 Further, such 
projects may be normative, as they may suggest, on the basis of these analyses, particular 
reforms that are deemed to be desirable. 
While there are important differences between these approaches, they share two similarities. 
One is that they both seek to explain crime or reform unjust criminal justice practices in 
different ways. The other is that they both take sexuality and gender to be the proper objects 
of “queer” (as alluded to above) (Ball 2013a: 2; Ball 2013b). A number of queer theorists 
have suggested that “queer” need not refer solely to sexuality and gender, and that the 
connections between these concepts need to be problematized. Of course, this is not to 
suggest that it is unproductive to connect “queer” to sexuality and gender and that these 
concepts need to be detached completely, but rather to suggest that it is equally important for 
criminological researchers to consider what might be gained from their uncoupling (Eng et al. 
                                                          
2 Lea suggests that this is not uncommon in deconstructive projects – they are often halted arbitrarily because of 
a desire to find solutions to problems (Lea 1998, 170). 
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2005: 4; Giffney 2004: 73-74). These emerging strains of queer theoretical work seek to 
avoid sexuality being taken for granted as the focus of such research, and also hope to 
prevent a notion of (stable) identity reappearing under another guise. Such an uncoupling of 
“queer” from sexuality and gender can help avoid assumptions that “queer” refers to 
something (like an identity by any other name), and move towards an approach that takes 
“queer” as a position. 
 
“Queer” as a Position 
To appreciate what it means to say that a “queer/ed criminology” could benefit from taking 
“queer” as a position, and why such an approach might make a valuable contribution, it is 
important to think broadly about the concept of “queer.” Dictionary definitions of “queer” 
often define it as “to quiz or ridicule, to spoil, to put out of order” (Sullivan 2003: 52). To 
“queer” something can therefore be thought of as doing something (Sullivan 2003: 50), and a 
lot of queer theoretical work has taken up this approach in a variety of ways. The study of 
numerous aspects of sexuality and gender diversity has gained a lot from this kind of 
approach to “queer,” particularly because of its clear connection to non-normativity and the 
challenging of normative regimes (Duggan 2001: 223; Smith in Sullivan 2003: 43). 
However, there is nothing in “queer,” thought of in this way, that requires its attachment to 
sexuality and gender. Thus it is possible to draw from this perspective and think of “queer” as 
denoting an attitude or a position in relation to what is taken as “normal.” Queer scholar 
David Halperin has articulated this view and suggests that “queer” “acquires its meaning 
from its oppositional relation to the norm. ‘Queer’ is by definition whatever is at odds with 
the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it 
necessarily refers” (Halperin 1995: 62, emphases in original). In this regard, the constituency 
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of “queer” can be understood to be open-ended, and what might constitute a common thread 
to queer work is a shared position amongst scholars vis-à-vis norms and normativity (Jagose 
1996: 98; Sullivan 2003: 43; Giffney 2004: 73-74). As such, queer can be thought of as a 
position in relation to the norm or even the taken-for-granted, as opposed to something 
(Halperin 1995: 62). 
This kind of approach to the notion of “queer” opens up a range of possibilities. It allows the 
focus of such intellectual and activist work to involve shaking up assumptions about what is 
natural or taken-for-granted; it allows foundational categories, essences, and oppositions to 
be confounded and unpacked; and it opens a space in which to explore the ways that 
particular phenomena and specific questions about our social world have been constructed 
(Jagose 1996: 98; Sullivan 2003: 50-51). Following this line of thought, then, “queer” 
becomes “an ongoing and necessarily unfixed site of engagement and contestation” (Berry 
and Jagose in Sullivan 2003, 43). 
It could be argued that the variety of “queer/ed criminologies” that currently exist are already 
doing something and thus working from this idea of “queer” as a position. Those that use 
queer theoretical perspectives to bring to light the heteronormativity of criminology, or 
explore how sexuality and gender-diversity are regulated, and identify how troubling binaries 
are reinforced through the justice system can certainly argue that they are productively 
queering criminological discourses. Those that say that they are queering criminology simply 
by adding the perspectives of LGBTQ people to criminological discourses, producing 
knowledge about their experiences of criminal justice, and seeking to reform unjust practices 
can make the same argument. 
However, there are convincing reasons to suggest that these notions of what it means to 
understand “queer” as a position can be pushed further, and that it might be more productive 
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to move towards the perspective suggested in this article. While projects focused on the 
inclusion of LGBTQ people within criminology are positive, especially given the enormity 
and severity of injustice experienced by LGBTQ people in their interaction with the criminal 
justice system (see Mogul et al. 2011), these projects can somewhat take for granted 
criminology and the institutions of criminal justice. At times, and like some other critical 
criminologies, they can tend toward the administrative and the problem-solving, assisting 
criminal justice institutions in their tasks of understanding crime and engaging in its 
management. Or, they might tend towards the emancipatory, calling for repressive relations 
of criminal justice to be removed as part of addressing the social injustices experienced by 
LGBTQ people (Young 2002: 260; Pavlich 1999: 37, 40). Even though these projects, and 
the critiques invoked, are important steps forward, particularly in order to make short-term 
gains in this area, others have warned of their potential dangers (see for example Pavlich 
1999). For example, such approaches may somewhat take for granted criminal justice 
institutions (and seek relatively minor reforms to their operation), they can perpetuate the 
status quo, and they can even solidify the assumptions made about those that are considered 
to form the constituency of “queer” and the disadvantage that they experience. These might 
not be effective paths to take in the long term (see Ball 2013b). 
Such approaches can also tend towards the explanatory, assisting criminology in producing 
explanations for crime and producing theories that are empirically grounded, positivist, and 
Modernist (Pavlich 1999). Again, the production of robust, systematic knowledge of 
criminological issues is positive and plays an important role in expanding criminology and 
providing a knowledge base for criminal justice policies. While these tasks are often 
criticized by many critical criminologists (Mooney 2012: 19; Young 2002: 253), many other 
critical criminologists engage in these activities because they can be useful (DeKeseredy 
2011: 7; Mooney 2012: 20). For example, such work might be thought of as necessary in 
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order to convince people to take critical criminologies seriously, and to affirm its 
epistemological position and relevance in the eyes of outsiders, not to mention offering 
knowledge that can help to alleviate the injustices experienced by some communities (see 
DeKeseredy 2011). 
However, the production of such knowledge, and its use in shaping administrative criminal 
justice policies, are not tasks that many queer theorists engage in, particularly if they take 
“queer” to denote a position. For example, queer theorists rarely undertake survey research, 
or engage in sophisticated statistical analyses to develop conclusions that they might be able 
to generalize and use to inform policy, which many criminologists do. By and large, queer 
theorists are wary of participating in these ways of producing and circulating knowledge, as 
they see that the effect of doing so is the reinforcement of those normative Modernist 
approaches to knowing (even inadvertently). They are also wary of producing knowledge that 
actively contributes to administrative projects that seek to regulate (see Halperin 1995: 184-
185; Sullivan 2003: 39-43). Thus, approaching “queer” as a position may be more productive 
for “queer/ed criminology,” and help avoid what queer theorists see as the dangers of 
stepping into the mainstream. 
So, it is important to note that a “queer/ed criminology” can be more than a project solely 
focused on including LGBTQ people in criminology and criminal justice institutions, 
particularly if “queer” is used to denote a position. Through such an approach, our ways of 
thinking may be more fundamentally altered than they might be if we were simply pointing to 
the absence of sexuality and gender diversity in our knowledges or institutions, or if we were 
to only focus on identifying their heteronormativity, or the cisgendered and binarist 
assumptions that exist within them. Such an approach would have in its sights a more 
fundamental reformulation of the epistemological and ontological grounds upon which we 
stand, as opposed to simply addressing an oversight in a body of knowledge. Further, this 
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kind of project would not simply consist of deconstruction and critique for their own sake. 
Such an approach may, in the long term, go further towards addressing the injustices that 
“queer/ed criminologies” have been posed as responses to. 
 
Critique 
This article will now explore one small way in which such a task might begin. It posits that 
such an approach can be developed by adopting a particular understanding of the critique 
engaged in or sought by such scholars. Exploring this perspective on critique will not only 
help to put into effect this understanding of “queer” as a position, but it will also assist in 
articulating the kind of critical project that it entails, and allow one to consider the 
connections that can be made to other critical criminologies. The approach to critique 
suggested here is one that draws from poststructural perspectives and is developed in the 
work of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. It is one that conceives of critique as “the art of 
not being governed” and as an activity that involves pushing against limits. 
It might be suggested that there are two general activities falling under the critical umbrella 
that ought to be distinguished: criticism and critique. According to Butler, criticism is 
focused on finding faults and making judgments. “Queer/ed criminologies” might tend 
towards engaging in criticism when researchers or activists argue that there is a lack of 
LGBTQ perspectives in criminology, that LGBTQ people experience injustice in the criminal 
justice system because of its heteronormativity or the cisgendered and binarized assumptions 
that it adopts, or when proposals for reform are put forward. These forms of criticism are 
important, playing a vital role in suggesting the direction that future analyses and political 
work ought to take, and identifying some of the targets for such action. However, Butler 
argues that criticism is not always entirely helpful because it can restrict the kinds of analyses 
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that critical thinkers can undertake, and it risks closure. As she states, “judgments operate... 
as ways to subsume a particular under an already constituted category” (Butler 2004c: ¶ 4; 
see also Pavlich 1999). 
Butler draws from Theodor Adorno to make this argument. As Adorno puts it, there is a 
“danger... of judging intellectual phenomena in a subsumptive, uninformed and 
administrative manner and assimilating them into the prevailing constellations of power 
which the intellect ought to expose” (cited in Butler 2004c: ¶¶ 3-4). The act of criticism often 
measures the world against particular criteria that are privileged (despite their historical, 
political, and cultural contingency), finds the world wanting according to such standards, and 
then (often) lapses into the dogmatic. Throughout, the critic is often also positioned as an 
expert legislating on how things ought to be (Pavlich 2001: 144-145; see also Foucault 1998: 
6). 
To move away from this, Butler follows Raymond Williams and suggests that we need a new 
vocabulary that might be used by those that do not wish to assume the right to judge. For 
Butler, an alternative is the notion of critique, which “asks after the occlusive constitution of 
the field of categories themselves” (Butler 2004c: ¶ 4) and the ways that they are ordered – a 
task that involves significant effort. It requires a suspension of judgment because “the 
question of whether or not a position is right, coherent, or interesting is, in this case, less 
informative than why it is we come to occupy and defend the territory that we do, what it 
promises us, from what it promises to protect us” (Butler 1995: 127-128). 
Critique, then, is a way of challenging the foreclosure of “reality” as produced through 
various forms of power. It identifies these foreclosures as illegitimate and utilizes them as 
opportunities to open up discursive systems on the basis of that which cannot be thought 
(Butler cited in Willig 2012: 142). As Butler suggests, “[t]he categories by which social life 
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are ordered produce a certain incoherence or entire realms of unspeakability” (Butler 2004c: 
¶ 10). As such, critique is initiated as a result of reaching a kind of limit in our ways of 
knowing and in our experiences, exposing that which, according to our current ways of 
thinking, appears to be “unspeakable” or “incoherent” (Butler 2004c: ¶ 10).  
To illustrate the importance of this perspective, Butler draws on her work exploring lives that 
“matter” – that is, those that are thought of as “liveable” and “grieveable” (Butler 2004a; 
Butler 2004b: 8; Butler 2009). She suggests that we can identify the limits of the “scenes of 
recognition” within which particular lives are thought of as “liveable” when we apprehend a 
life that is constituted as “unliveable.” Butler has explored a variety of such “unliveable” 
lives, including the lives of many trans* people, those that experience HIV/AIDS, or victims 
of war (Butler 2004a; Butler 2004b; Butler 2009). Engaging in a critique that exposes these 
limits and reshapes these “scenes of recognition” becomes necessary for the survival of those 
whose lives are not recognized as lives (Willig 2012: 140-141). As we will see, this is a 
useful way of thinking about the limits of a “queer/ed criminology” and what it seeks to do. 
The perspective Butler puts forward here builds on Foucault’s approach to critique. Foucault 
suggests that critique is historically bound with the question of “how not to be governed” 
(Foucault 1978: 44). More precisely, Foucault states that this refers to “how not to be 
governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in 
mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them” (Foucault 
1978: 44, emphasis in original). Naturally, Foucault is drawing from his own broad 
conception of government, which refers to the variety of interactions between power relations 
and discourses through which subjects are formed, ways of knowing produced, and the 
“conduct of conduct” achieved (see Foucault, 1982; Dean 2010). The movement against 
being governed that he refers to can be understood as a call for us to push against the ways in 
which a variety of discourses create our objects of knowledge, format for us the world as we 
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perceive it, offer us norms to which we ought to aspire or against which we are judged, and 
tell us who we are. In short, it is one that calls for us to move beyond what we see as the 
limits of our lives and the ways in which we have been governed as subjects through 
particular ways of knowing and acting. Thus, such an approach to critique involves a 
multiplication of the points at which governmental limits are identified as contingent, 
subjects are uncoupled from their subjectivity, and possible paths of transgression are opened 
up (Pavlich 2001: 154). 
An approach to critique that seeks to avoid foreclosure and open up new possibilities could 
also draw from other aspects of Foucault’s attitude, including his “hyper- and pessimistic 
activism,” which recognizes that political action is ongoing and always potentially 
problematic, not because “everything is bad, but [because] everything is dangerous, which is 
not exactly the same as bad,” and means that “we always have something to do” (Foucault 
1983: 256). It would also draw on Mitchell Dean’s notion of the “restive problematization of 
the given” – that is, a practice that “has the effect of the disturbance of narratives of both 
progress and reconciliation, finding questions where others had located answers” and which 
recognises that “the trajectory of the historical forms of truth and knowledge [is] without 
origin or end” (Dean 1994: 4). It is for these reasons that such critique can be distinguished 
from criticism and seeks to avoid legislating what ought to happen, in favour of a more open 
ended struggle against governmental limits. 
This kind of critique involves (and, indeed, requires) a self-transformation, and, in particular, 
the formation of a particular kind of critical subject. Along these lines, Foucault understood 
critique as a virtue or an attitude, and referred to an “art of not being governed” (Foucault 
1978: 45, emphasis added). The critical attitude involves the transformation of “a certain 
relationship to what exists, to what one knows, to what one does... to society, to culture, and 
also... to others” (Foucault 1978: 42). Being confronted with one’s limits and being prompted 
18 
 
by an openness to, and engagement with, a knowledge that is not one’s own is invariably a 
transformative process (Butler 2004c: ¶ 13). To most effectively bring this transformation 
about and form oneself as a critical subject here, it is necessary to cultivate the characteristics 
of “voluntary insubordination” or “reflected intractability” (Foucault 1978: 47). In this way, 
Foucault suggests critique can become “the movement by which the subject gives himself 
[sic] the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses on 
truth,” producing “the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we would call, in a 
word, the politics of truth” (Foucault 1978: 47). 
 
Critique and “Queer/ed Criminology” 
Engaging in a form of critique that accords with this notion of “not being governed” would be 
one way of putting into practice within criminology the approach to “queer” that was 
suggested earlier. Interrogating foundational concepts and pushing against what are taken for 
granted or considered to be norms involves an engagement with the limits of thought, and an 
attempt to avoid being governed by them. While there have been a number of moves made in 
this direction in critical criminology more generally, and critical criminologists have also 
sought to move beyond the denunciation, sectarianism, and exclusions produced by those 
critical criminologists who engage in criticism (see Pavlich 1999; Brown 2002: 104), the way 
that “queer/ed criminologies” specifically might develop and draw from this kind of approach 
to critique requires elaboration. This section offers some suggestions about how such an 
approach might proceed, and what a “queer/ed criminology” might look like if it turned 
towards this kind of project. 
To begin, a “queer/ed criminology” developed along these lines might avoid simply 
recounting the experiences of particular groups, adding them to criminological knowledges, 
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building theories around them, or producing explanations of particular crimes from a “queer” 
perspective. And it might avoid becoming solely a more pragmatic project focused on the 
material injustices and criminological issues of concern to LGBTQ people, along the lines of 
left realism. While these are important and productive, and have been the tasks of other 
critical criminologies (DeKeseredy 2011: 37; Mooney 2012: 27; Young 2002: 267), they do 
not necessarily align with the approach to “queer” and critique discussed here. This is 
because such projects may require the adoption of particular objects of knowledge, or 
particular assumptions about certain phenomena (such as their harmfulness) – objects that 
must remain the target of critique – in order to proceed (Bessant 2002: 220; Carlen 1998: 71). 
For example, exploring intimate partner violence as experienced within LGBTQ communities 
is an important task in a queer criminology that seeks to increase criminological knowledge 
and address injustice for those communities (Ristock 2011; Erbaugh 2007). However, doing 
so may rely on adopting particular understandings of the object “intimate partner violence,” 
or subjectivities that attach to terms such as “offender” and “victim” that can delimit the kind 
of thought undertaken in the area (see Lea 1998: 167 for a similar example). A queer critique 
could make a space for these objects and subjectivities to be interrogated – and interrogated 
in a way that moves beyond simply opening them up to include LGBTQ people and their 
experiences. While testing the limits of thought in these cases may produce discomfort, such 
critique is an important task in order to break through those instances where concepts are 
taken for granted, other possibilities foreclosed, and normative orders prescribed. In short, it 
is to avoid being governed by these understandings, or, at the very least, to prevent them from 
standing without interrogation, and not trying to close down new spaces for thought too 
hastily. There are clear connections here between this approach and deconstructive 
approaches in criminology (Lea 1998: 167; Cohen 1998). 
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While an “inclusive” approach seems to be one favored in many “queer/ed criminologies,” 
the direction put forward in this article would approach this slightly differently. It would seek 
to open a space in which criminologists can engage with a range of lives that may have been 
rendered “unliveable” and a range of subjectivities that have been foreclosed. This differs to a 
straightforward “inclusion project” for at least three reasons. First, an inclusion project can, in 
some instances, come very close to the notion of judgment, wherein the justice system or 
criminological knowledge is judged against a particular standard that the critic has set (e.g. 
the lack of representation of LGBTQ people in criminology). Second, an inclusion project 
might set a high cost to such inclusion. It may require groups of people to be constituted 
(problematically) under the sign of an identity category (such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
trans*, or queer) through which they have been governed or around which they have been 
encouraged to organize politically (with mixed success), and seek to achieve such inclusion 
within the parameters of a discipline that seeks to “know” about and govern them (see Ball 
2013b; Bessant 2002: 231). A third (and related) point is that it seeks recognition within 
existing conditions and already constituted parameters, as opposed to questioning the terms 
of that recognition and the costs under which it occurs (not just in criminology but in broader 
scenes of recognition as well) (see Willig 2012). In these instances, a “queer/ed criminology” 
might push against being governed by these various terms and conditions of inclusion. 
To avoid these issues, a “queer/ed criminology” might seek to open spaces and shift relations 
so as to multiply the subjectivities that can be recognized, and create new possibilities for 
knowing about crime, justice, and beyond – something that is not always achieved in the 
same way by “inclusive” approaches. It might help people to detach themselves from the way 
their lives have been inscribed (or not) in particular discourses, and in the truths, orderings, 
and ethical precepts that are installed in forms of government. And it might avoid simply 
extending the power of the critic to legislate in a particular domain (Pavlich 2001: 152; 
21 
 
Pavlich 1999: 40; Butler 2004c: ¶ 26). All of these activities are attempts to avoid being 
governed in one way or another. It is here that it would be productive to draw from the 
experience of feminist and counter-colonial criminologies, for example, which have been 
influenced by poststructuralist thought in their own ways, and have sought to move beyond 
simply including groups into an existing discipline towards fundamentally questioning the 
discipline itself (Carrington 2002: 116, 118; Cunneen 2011). 
Adopting this notion of critique within a “queer/ed criminology” might also produce among 
queer criminologists a productive scepticism towards those reforms to criminal justice policy 
that are presented as progressive (see Cohen 1998: 110, 117). Drawing from Foucault’s 
suggestion that everything is potentially dangerous (Foucault 1983: 256), and that one is 
always caught within power relations, forms of government, and normative regimes, a 
“queer/ed criminology” along these lines would seek to avoid being governed by 
“progressive” assumptions, programs, or positions in the wide context of crime and justice – 
even those suggested by queer criminologists. Thus, such an approach might follow Dean’s 
argument that any claims that a particular reform or program makes to being progressive, or 
achieving social justice, ought not to be considered a description of those programs, but 
rather to form a part of their rationalizations, operating to enroll others in the task of putting 
them into practice, and instituting their own normative orders in the process (Dean 2010: 45-
46). Similar kinds of arguments have been made in other queer commentary that discusses 
the exclusions perpetuated by, and forms of homonormativity produced within, apparently 
progressive gains made in LGBTQ politics (Duggan 2003; Puar 2007). As such, approaches 
to “queer/ed criminology” that adopt the positions on critique discussed here would not only 
be directed towards “traditional,” “mainstream,” “conventional” or “non-queer” 
criminologies, but also towards “critical” and “queer/ed” criminologies, and the politics that 
surround them. In this process, they might draw effectively on other work developed within 
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queer commentary, and also within other criminologies, that critique the variety of 
investments made in the institutions of the state when seeking to achieve justice (Brown 
1995; Puar 2007; Mogul et al. 2011). 
This need not imply that a “queer/ed criminology” along these lines would suggest that 
pushing against power is useless and that no short- or long-term gains can be made to achieve 
justice. In fact, it sees this pushing against power as productive. While one might cautiously 
note that justice itself cannot be achieved – it is always unfinished and involves appeals 
towards the future (Derrida 1990) – pushing against forms of government is a productive 
process because it allows one to engage with those regimes more effectively, work with them 
in order to reformulate them, and seek to discover the degrees of freedom that they allow 
(Foucault 1982: 341). It also allows for a recognition that even in seeking to move away from 
problematic relations of power, new forms of government are being shaped and implemented 
that must also constitute the target for critique – thereby highlighting the importance of 
Foucault’s “hyper- and pessimistic activism,” Dean’s restive problematization of the given, 
and, ultimately, the impossibility of a queer critique resting. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has suggested one way of thinking about how a “queer/ed criminology,” which 
understands “queer” to denote a position, might proceed. It has focused on a particular 
understanding of critique – one that sees it as the “art of not being governed” – and how this 
might be utilized within such a “queer/ed criminology.” This perspective draws from the idea 
that “queer” can be uncoupled from a sole focus on sexuality and gender diversity, and can 
signify a pushing against the variety of limits, normative orders, and ways of knowing that 
govern our lives. This kind of “queer/ed criminology” would be one that opens up fissures in 
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these forms of ordering and creates new spaces for pushing what it is possible to think, and 
how it is possible to be. It would also be one that maintains a skeptical stance towards that 
which exists, avoids taking things for granted or settling, and certainly does not invest in 
moves to be incorporated or assimilated into existing regimes. 
While the uncoupling of “queer” from sexuality and gender diversity might be troubling for 
some, it can also be productive, as this article has suggested. One could argue that if the 
connection between “queer” and sexuality and gender remained unexamined, then that 
connection would effectively become essentialized, and placed outside the proper targets of 
critique. Notably, then, the kind of critique produced by the concept of “queer” begins with 
just such an interrogation of “queer” itself. However, there is nothing to suggest that the 
relationships between these concepts need to be jettisoned entirely – the experiences of 
LGBTQ people are still a very clear starting point from which to identify the limits of, and 
exclusions effected by, various forms of government, and work of this kind will clearly have 
a benefit for many of those that connect to, or find some form of comfort in, the concept of 
“queer.” 
This article has also briefly pointed out how such an approach to “queer/ed criminology” 
might sit productively in relation to other critical criminologies (including those that engage 
in criticism in order to identify limits to push against) and, indeed, other “queer/ed 
criminologies.” There is a lot that might be taken from that existing work within criminology 
(particularly feminist, counter-colonial, postmodern and deconstructive approaches), and this 
article offers only one contribution pointing out some of these connections. It remains an 
important task for future developments of “queer/ed criminology” to chart these connections 
with more precision (see Carlen 2011; Carlen 1998: 64). 
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It is clear, though, that many aspects of the “queer critique” presented here align with existing 
deconstructive approaches within criminology. Despite these connections, it would be 
premature to suggest that a “queer/ed criminology” does little more than repeat or recycle 
these existing deconstructive approaches. After all, deconstruction in critical criminology 
means many different things and is used in many different ways (Bessant 2002: 231, 234; Yar 
2012: 52; Carlen 1998: 71; Lea 1998: 167, 169), including in the service of what might 
otherwise be understood as emancipatory or inclusionary political or empirical projects that 
limit the targets of deconstruction – projects that might be problematized in a queer critique. 
If a “queer/ed criminology” is to embrace the notion of critique as the “art of not being 
governed,” it is therefore unlikely to sit content among some of these approaches without 
getting restless, and without seeking to interrogate their limits and the normative orders that 
they produce. Perhaps the extent to which these other deconstructive approaches seek to 
avoid being governed themselves – by objects of knowledge, unspoken assumptions, the 
necessity to suggest reforms – and whether they maintain an open intellectual stance or 
foreclose upon particular avenues of thought and action and seek to institute new forms of 
government, might be the tests that determine how much overlap exists between a “queer/ed 
criminology” and deconstructive approaches within critical criminology. A “queer/ed 
criminology” would not simply repeat these existing deconstructive approaches, but would 
expand them and develop them in new ways, doing what it could to ensure that the notion of 
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